Security in the global village
BY ELAINE DEZENSKI '92 and THOMAS SANDERSON '92
Al Qaeda and several like-minded groups were largely kept at bay in 2006 as the United States continued investing at home and abroad to prevent the next terrorist attack and safeguard critical infrastructure, while also seeking to better understand an elusive threat. While improved intelligence capabilities are needed to counter radical Islamist terrorism, strengthening border systems will require a comprehensive vision for a flexible infrastructure that protects our homeland and facilitates legitimate flows of visitors, workers and commerce.
The threat
U.S. government officials consider counterterrorism efforts "both a battle of arms and ideas." Al Qaeda's message that Islam is under siege by the West and its corrupt Arab allies has spread easily among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This notion rings true for many who see Western support of authoritarian regimes; favorable U.S. treatment of Israel; exploitation of oil and geography; and a high-casualty war in Iraq despite the absence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and al Qaeda connections.
Terror groups have shifted from the centralized al Qaeda organization to a more diffuse, independent set of semiaffiliated groups. Most are Sunni Muslim, but Shiite groups, largely backed by Iran, also present a serious danger. These organizations range from smaller units of "homegrown" terrorists to larger groups such as the Algerian-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.
Perhaps of most concern to law enforcement and intelligence services are the homegrown actors. These individuals, with no previous history of violence or radical political behavior, have been killed or arrested in connection with terror strikes in Europe and elsewhere.
Radical Islamists have two resilient and powerful tools at their disposal. The most versatile is the Internet. There are a reported 3,000 or more pro- al Qaeda Web sites where people can download propaganda and recruitment videos, instructions for bomb miniaturization and placement, WMD recipes and fundraising tips. The Internet has also opened up roles for Muslim women who otherwise would not be able to engage in terrorist activity and support. The second important tool is the unregulated hawala, a worldwide, trust-based money-transfer network with no paper records. This allows people and groups to send illicit funds with little fear of exposure.
Pakistan and Afghanistan remain the most significant areas of radical Islamist terrorist activity, and with a resurgent Taliban, are likely to remain so. An opium crop exceeding 6,000 tons translates into $25 billion of street-value heroin, and will support both al Qaeda and Taliban operations. Beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan, many other groups will remain focused on local goals such as overthrowing regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Meanwhile, tension between Muslim and non-Muslim peoples in Thailand, China, Sudan, the Philippines and Russia could easily escalate. International cooperation is vital. Operating in the French language and with CIA funding, a multinational counterterrorism center called Alliance Base is up and running in Paris. But U.S. pressure on other nations to adopt our posture has generated international fatigue and outright opposition. United States' actions in Iraq and Guantanamo have furthermore made international cooperation difficult.
The war in Iraq has caused the most serious problems. In September 2006, the New York Times reported that all 16 members of the U.S. intelligence community concluded the American-led war was exacerbating the global terror threat. Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as the premier training ground for terrorists. Looming ominously on the horizon are the foreign fighters in Iraq who will return to their home countries. The largest number comes from Saudi Arabia, but Europe is a significant source as well. While there are no exact numbers, security officials believe that European Islamist extremists numbering in the low hundreds have fought in Iraq. What happens when these fighters, considered heroes to young, disenfranchised Muslims, return to their often poor neighborhoods outside of Paris, Manchester and Hamburg?
The goal of the United States intelligence community is to discover and disrupt terror plots before they materialize. But despite an army of 100,000 employees and a budget of $44 billion, American intelligence capabilities are inadequate, making it difficult to keep threats from reaching our shores. The problem is a slowly changing bureaucracy that is still largely designed to counter a massive state threat.
Changes in the intelligence community are needed and nongovernmental, non-American expertise is fundamental. Key resources include cultural anthropologists, sociologists, and media and information specialists. Those with multicultural backgrounds and unique foreign language skills will make the biggest impact. Americans who have traveled widely will make better Foreign Service officers and intelligence analysts.
Tailored approaches by multinational teams with expertise in a specific region or culture are needed. Lumping unrelated extremists into a global war on terrorism ignores the detail necessary to disable or co-opt them. Without making dramatic changes, America increases the chances that some of these extremists will slip through our borders.
Securing the border
loser to home, terrorism and transnational threats have redefined the way we think about security, resulting in the investment of billions of dollars to deploy new and improved technologies to stop an increasingly unclear and elusive enemy. In fact, the terrorist threat is the driving factor pushing the U.S. government and many others to introduce new infrastructure, systems and personnel that otherwise would have taken many more years to deploy. Some policies seem appropriate, such as 100 percent baggage screening at airports, more border inspectors and requiring biometric checks of foreign visitors against databases of known criminals. Other policies, such as banning snow globes, matches and lighters, seem to suggest that more effective tools are still lacking. The resulting patchwork of regulations simply annoys travelers, who must remove shoes, jackets and liquids, and endure queues at our ports of entry.
Since the 9/11 attacks, investment in border security has more than doubled-from $4.6 billion in 2001 to $10.4 billion in 2006. (1) Other regions and governments have reacted in a similar fashion. The European Union is expected to spend close to •1 billion for an "external border fund" over the next six years to manage its diverse and growing borders. (2) International cooperation is critical to ensure that our global transportation and commercial networks can continue to operate. The U.S. and Canada have pledged to develop systems and work with each other. But will such efforts contribute to an effective international system for travel, trade and tourism? Without a vision to define the border of the future, it's hard to know.
A clearly articulated vision would assist in looking beyond today's crisis. Just as the border of the future must improve security, it must also support travel and tourism, and help manage the flow of foreign workers who continue to fill urgent demands in many sectors of the U.S. economy. We need to keep our doors open to legitimate interests. However, achieving greater security while keeping the "welcome mat" on our doorstep is no small feat.
The post-9/11 focus on security has greatly influenced U.S. immigration policy, particularly at the southern border. Many lawmakers argue that security must come first at U.S. borders, and by security they mean a very long fence. This conversation is often followed by a heated debate about what to do after that fence is built. The Department of Homeland Security has estimated that its "Secure Border Initiative" will require $2 billion to control the borders with Mexico and Canada by 2011. However, there should be no doubt that any U.S. border security plan is doomed to fail unless it addresses the underlying demand for foreign workers, approximately 500,000 of whom enter our country each year. (3)
Many programs have been proposed to address the need- from additional border patrol agents to more secure passports and faster airport screening-but no silver bullet for efficient, reliable and cost-effective solutions has been identified. "Smart" technologies like Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFID) are often part of the proposal to speed up traffic at the land borders, as are using biometrics such as fingerprints that allow for quick identification and verification of persons as they enter and leave the country.
But security policy should offer a compelling vision for the future. The concept of a seamless, interoperable border system that whisks low-risk travelers and cargo on to the next destination should be our focus.
What's needed?
First, the border of the future should be in many ways "virtual." In other words, the physical demarcation of the border-the line painted on the road, the gate, or even the fence-has and will continue to become less relevant as we rely more on technology and screening to identify and catch threats as early as possible, while allowing legitimate travelers to proceed with less delay.
Second, the border of the future should reflect an even stronger risk-based approach where governments use information, intelligence and so-called "pre-screening tools," such as analyzing passenger biographic information and employing behavioral pattern recognition to spot suspicious behavior. In other words, we need to identify threats as early as possible. Governments rarely have all the tools and resources they need to achieve 100 percent security, but using risk-based programs eases our search for the proverbial needle in the haystack.
Third, the border of the future should be defined by systems that can quickly process information from many sources-whether through biometrics, a real-time validation of a travel document, or a fusion of intelligence that provides a comprehensive view of the traveler within seconds; or verifying the status of a guest worker. Creating truly secure borders is very much dependent upon our ability to gather, share, analyze and make the best decision based on all available information.
Finally, the border of the future must reflect unprecedented international cooperation. With a threat so difficult to identify, understand and counter, it is imperative to apply U.S. and foreign expertise-from both inside and outside of governments. Working through international organizations and with trusted governments, we must develop integrated systems to secure and facilitate travel and commerce. We've only just begun this process. As technology and systems improve, so will the ability to make an early, informed decision about a person, whether it is a tourist or a temporary worker.
In the end, counterterrorism and homeland security policies and programs must support an acceptable balance between the threat and the solution. American successes and failures abroad will have a direct impact at home. We can't get there without a plan-or without partners. And please, can we keep our clothes on at the checkpoint?
NOTES
1) Source: The White House, "President Bush Signs Secure Fence Act," October 26, 2006.
2) Source: Europa Press Release, "Q&A on the legislative package of EU programmes for the financial programming period 2007-2013, " May 24, 2006.
3) Source: Migration Information Source, "Share of Foreign Born in the Total US Population and the US Civilian Labor Force, 1970-2005."
